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The central argument of this paper is that concepts such as "social 
preference,'' ''social rationality, n "public interest," "social benefits" 
and ''social welfare" are unnecessary for the developme-nt and application 
of welfare economics principles and the design and/or modification of 
political economic processes. The primary reasons for using these 
constructions as offered by Samuelson and Arrow ai"e misleading if not 
simply wrong. The features of the concepts which rnake their use 
compelling, are also features of other approaches to problems. Further-
more, since the tools themselves automatically restrict analysis to a 
rather ''uninteresting'' family of political-economic processes, their use 
may even be detrimental to the development of a relevant body of theory. 
The fundamental ideas presented here have been offered in more 
precise form elsewhere [9], [10]. But, the overriding issues are somewhat 
obscured there, by the detail. The broader, somewhat more philosophical 
implications discussed here, are, I suspect, of greater interest. 
*Presented at the Seminar on Mathematical Theory of Collective 
De cis ions, Harbor Town, South Carolina, August, 1971. The author 
wishes to thank Robert P. Parks for his comments on an early draft. 
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The arguments of the paper will proceed as follows. The fit•st 
section is devoted to a discussion about the relationship between rational 
social choice, social preference, social benefits, welfare, etc. From 
the point of vi.ew of social choice theory they are all the same concept. 
Those readers who are impatient with "formalism" are urged to stay 
awake for the first section. The failure, in the literature, to make certain 
distinctions precise, has resulted in some rather wide-spread misunder-
standings. 
Having provided the reader with an understanding of the concepts 
the discussion moves to the two major justifications for the use of these 
constructions. The Samuelson argument is, roughly, that the employn::tent 
of the social welfare function is simply a reflection of a requirement that 
social choices conform to~ system of ethics. The criticism of this 
argument offered here is that systems of ethics, which are capable of 
being represented by such functions, are but a small, uninteresting 
subset of ethics. Scholarly preoccupation with this subset of ethical 
propositions has caused the scientific implications of other ethical 
propositions, to be completely neglected. 
The second major argument in support of the use of social 
preference relations has been advanced by Arrow. His argument is, 
roughly, that the existence of a social preference relation is necessary in 
order for the outcome of social choice processes to be in-dependent of the 
path (or sequence) of choice. The third section of the paper is used to 
demonstrate that such a claim is, in general, simply wrong. 
The final section is a summary. It is argued there that Arrow's 
General Possibility Theorem is actually a criticism of the use of the 
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above tools. Other approaches can both retain the advantages and circwnvent 
the disadvantages. 
SECTION ONE 
The section proceeds as follows. First some notation and interpre-
tations are provided for those unfamiliar with the social choice literature., 
The discussion then moves to the topic of ''rational" social choice. Some 
examples of errors are given in order to clarify the precise meaning. 
The concept is connected, from the point of view of model building, to 
11 social welfare," ' 1social benefits," etc. I argue that, from this point 
of view the concepts are the same (they all imply rational social choice 
in any case, and also vice versa in the finite case). The discussion then 
jumps to a characterization of ethical propositions where it is argued 
that only a limited class of ethics would, if imposed, require choice to 
be rational. 
Social Choice 
In order to keep the discussion brief, the interpretations will be 
restricted to those of economic models. The following concepts will be 
used in notational form: 
An alternative or social state will be denoted by the lower case 
letters {x, y, z, ... } In the case of an exchange economy model an 
alternative would be a matrix, each row of which would indicate a given 
individual's consumption level of the various commodities. If the model 
is complicated by production, time, random elements, etc., the symbols 
and concepts are intended to hold there as well. 
The set of conceivable alternatives will be designated as E. This 
is a universal set, such as a consumption set in (Debreu type) economic 
inodels. Sometimes such sets are referred to as a "commodity space.'' 
An agenda is a subset of E and unless some particular subset is 
of interest, will be denoted as v . The agenda can be viewed as a 
production possibilities set or consumption possibilities set or activities 
possibilities set, depending upon the model. As distinguished from E , 
the a8"enda refers to that subset of E the existence of which would 
violate no laws of nature, resource endowments, etc. 
The set of adnlissible agenda is simply a family of agenda. The 
symbol will be u = { vl' vz· v m} , when no particular family 
needs to be isolated. An adnlissible agenda, then, is a set of· subsets 
of E . It could be a family of consumption possibilities sets, production 
possibilities sets, etc., depending upon the interpretation of the social 
states and agenda. Social processes must operate under varying circum-
stances and one of the things whiCh varies is the agenda. The admissible 
agenda is a set which designates the range over which the agenda might 
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vary. Of course, which subsets of E , which agenda, are in the admissible 
agenda is intended to be dictated by the particular problem·, or application, 
at hand. For example, in some cases (!((E) would be a natural family, 1 
A society is simply a vector (R1, R 2 , .. , R ) where R. is the m ' 
preference relation2 for individual i and where there are n members 
of society. A set, D , of societies will indicate the set of admissible 
societies. 
A social choice function is a function with domain3 U@ D, and 
range €? (E) such that 
1 
V (v, R1, . C (v, R 1, .. ,R )C v. n 
The symbol 6> (E) indicates the power set of E - • the set of all 
subsets of E . In the case of an infinite E the set of all subsets may be 
11too large'' to be of interest. For example, choice over 11 open" sets or 
non convex sets, may be too much to demand. Again these technical 
complications will be overlooked here so that the general problem 
can be discussed. 
2
we assume individual preference relations are total, reflexive, transi·-
tive binary relations on E. More precisely, a binary relation R, on a set 
E is said to be 
a) total in case (V x) (V y) [xRy V yRx] 
XE E y f. X 
y E E 
b) reflexive in case (V x) xRx 
x e E 
c) transitiveincase (yx) (yy) (yz) [xRyAyRz:;>xRz] 
XEE yEE ZEE 
y#x zfy 
Z f X 
3 The symbol ® represents a cartesian product. Certainly, for 
some purposes one might want to restrict the analysis to subsets of 
U ® D. This possibility will not be pursued her"e. 
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That is, for any particular agenda in the admissible set and any particular 
society in the admissible set, the "chosen 11 set is a subset of that 
particular agenda. 
The idea of a social choice function will be used for two separate 
ideas in this paper. In some places the functional notation will be used 
to represent an ethic. In other places the functional notation will be 
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used to represent a process. The distinctions will be made clear below, 
but I wish to dwell for a moment, now, on the ''process'' interpretation. 
By 'represent some process' I mean that the "chosen" elements 
are the equilibriums of the process. Each process has its own represen-
tation. For example, we could let the function cC· E. (v, R
1
, .. ,R) 
n 
represent the competitive equilibrium allocations when v is the consumption 
possibilities set and (R1, ... , Rn) are the individuals' preferences. As 
v and/or individual tastes change, the function simply indicates the new 
equilibrium set. Different choice functions would indicate different processes. 
More importantly, however, we will say that two processes are the same 
in case they have the same choice function-- that is, two processes are 
the same. in case they always have the same equilibriums. One purpose 
for making this distinction is that "imagined" or "abstract 11 processes can 
be postulated and then one can ask whether or not such processes can 
4 In the last section a distinction will be made between 1'implementable 11 
processes and 11non-implementable" processes. The difference is between 
choice functions which could be representations of actual processes and 
those which cannot. 
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actually be constructed. 
Rational Social Choice 
A choice function is rational in case it can be rationalized. If a 
binary relation exists such that the chosen elements can always be viewed 
as the maximal elements, according to this binary relation, then the choice 
function is rational. Notice first that the concept of rational refers to a 
sequence of choices -- to the behavior of the choice function over part of its 
domain rather than its behavior at a single point. Notice also that the 
''chooser" need not be ''purposeful" or 11cognitive." In fact, a given choice 
function, if rational, may be rationalized by several different binary 
relations simultaneously. Furthermore, a choice function may be 
rationalized by a binary relation which does not have the "usual" properties 
of "preference relations. 115 
In the case of social choice we proceed as follows. A social choice 
function is said to be rational in case, for given and fixed individual 
preferences, it chooses from the various agenda .!!if it used a binary 
5
The 11 indifference relation" may not be transitive or the "strong 
preference" relation may not be transitive, or it is not total, etc. In 
general one can view these properties as various "degrees" of rationality. 
Conditions on the choice function which guarantee various "degrees" of rationality 
have been developed (2], (5), (7], (9], (II]. 
From one point of view the theory of preference is simply an 
assertion that choice can be rationalized by~ binary relation with a 
particular set of properties (total, reflexive and transitive). That is, 
the theory asserts that the "choosing agent, 11 whatever it is, "chooses" 
~..!:.!.it had a preference relation with the usual properties and in every 
situation it chooses those alternatives which are nmost preferred. " 
relation, R , as a "criterion" and chose the 11 best 11 (the R-maximal 
elements
6 ) accordingly. More forrn.ally, a social choice function is said 
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to be rational over the domain,U ® D in case for each (R1, . ,R ) f D, n 
there is a binary relation R such that 
( Vv) C (v,R 1, {xt.v xRyforallyt-v}. 
v £ u 
The social choice function is said to be total, reflexive, transitive rational 
in case, the social choice is rational and for each vector (R1, , .. , Rn) 
the rationalization R is total, reflexive, transitive. 
The following three examples serve to illustrate the technical 
meaning. In the example the notation 1'h( · )1 1 is used in place of C( ·) 
because the latter has been given a rather precise definition. Notice, 
in these examples the individuals 1 preferences have been dropped as 
parameters. We are free to do this since they are held constant in the 
definition of rationality, 
Example 1. The choice function h({a,b}) = {a,b}, h({a,c}) = {a,c} 
h({ a, b, c}) = { b}, is not rational. Why? From the first two choices we 
get aRb & aRc as a property of any rationalization R . The ' 1a" is 
R-maximal relative to {a, b, c "} for any rationalization which exists. 
So, if the choice is rational, that is, if a rationalization exists,the element 
11a 11 must be among those chosen from the set {a, b, c}. We see by 
construction a i h( {a, b, c }} so no rationalization exists and the choice 
6 See the glossary. 
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is not rational. 
Example 2. The choice function h( {a, b, c}) = {a} is total, 
reflexive, transitive rational. We need consider only a few of the 
many rationalizations, say, aPb & aPe & bPc; or, aPb & aPe & cPb; 
or, aPb & aPe & blc, where P and I are the usual "strong preferencen 
and ''indifference" relations. 7 We note, from_ this example, that 
rationalizations need not be unique. 8 
Example 3. The choice function h( {a, b}) = {a, b} , h( {a, c} ) = { a} 
h({b,c}) = {b,c}, h({a,b,c}) = {a,b}, is total, reflexive rational but 
not transitive rational. The rationalization is alb, blc, aPe. Notice 
that the binary relation I is not transitive and thus, neither is R , 
However, h( v ) is for each v , the set of R-maximal elements. 
In order to explore further the technical meaning of rational choice 
we turn now to a rather important misunderstanding in the literature. 
The misunderstanding is over which of Arrow's conditions the method of 
''rank-order voting'' violates. Arrow suggests, incorrectly, that this 
process violates his Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition. 
Actually, it satisfies that condition but does violate the 11 rationality 11 
conditions. 
The following axiom is essentially a quote of Arrow's definition of 
7 See the Glossary. 
8 
In the case of this example we have a severely restricted admissible 
agenda-- 'Z{ = {{a, b,c}}. If "U contains all two element sets then any 
reflexive rationalization will be unique. 
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Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, with slight changes made to keep 
the notation uniform with this paper. 9 His discussion is then quoted. 
Condition 3. Let (R1, .•. , Rn) and (RJ. ••.. , R~) be two sets 
of individual orderings and let C(S, R 1, • 
be the corresponding social choices. If, for all individuals i, and all x 
and all y in a given agenda S xR1y if and only if xR~y. then 
C(S, R 1, . ,R'). n 
The.reasonableness of this condition can be seen by consideration 
of the possible results in a method of choice which does not satisfy 
Condition 3, the rank-order method of voting frequently used in 
clubs. With a finite number of candidates, let each individual rank 
all the candidates, i.e., designate his first-choice candidate, 
second-choice, etc., choices, the higher weight to the higher 
choice, and then let the candidate with the highest weighted sum 
of votes be elected. In particular, suppose that there are three 
voters and four candidates, x, y, z, and w. Let the weights for 
the first, second, third, and fourth choices be 4, 3, 2, and l, 
respectively. Suppose that individuals 1 and 2 rank the candidates 
in the order x, y, z, and w, while individual 3 ranks them in the 
order z, w, x, andy. Under the given electoral system, xis 
chosen. Then, certainly, if y is deleted from the ranks of the 
9 Arrow's exact statement is: 
Condition3: LetR1, ... ,R and Ri, ... ,R' be 
two sets of individual orderings an~ let C{SJ and C'(S) ~e the 
corresponding social choice functions. If, for all individuals 
i and all x and y m a given environme11t S , xRiY if and 
only if xRiy. then C(S) and C'(S) are the same (independent 
of irrelevant alternatives). 
[1, p. 27]. 
The reader may be interested in the comparison of this axiom with 
the one stated and used by Blau [3]. This reformulation of the 
Arrow framework is exceptionally interesting since it is the'"popularized" 
version of Arrow's work which tends to obscure the interpretations 
explored here. 
candidates, the system applied to the rema1n1ng candidates 
should yield the same result, especially since, in this case, 
y is inferior to x , according to the tastes of every individual; 
but, if y is in fact deleted, the indicated electoral system would 
yield a tie between :x: and z . 
[1, p. 27] 
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Close examination of the axiom reveals that the claim in the quote 
is simply wrong. The axiom refers to the behavior of t]:le social choice 
function in cases where S is~ and the other parameters, individuals' 
preferences, change. On the other hand the ;;_xa.mple pertains to a situation 
where the set S changes (from { w, x, y, z} to { w, x, z} ) and 
individual preferences are fixed. Suppose the agenda is {W~ -*'1 z) and 
the preferences are as initially given. The social choice is { x, z}. 
Now, suppose individuals 1 and 2 continue to rank w, x and z in the order 
x, z, w, and suppose that individual 3 ranks them in order z, w, x. The 
choice over { w, x, z}, using the rank order method, remains { x, z} 
regardless of how the individuals feel about y. The reader can continue 
to verify that the rank order method satisfies the axiom, contrary to 
Arrow's claim. 10 
10This example is not the only one in Arrow's writings which has 
served to detract scholars from a proper understanding of the axiom. 
Consider the following example which was called to my attention by R. P. Parks. 
Condition 3 is perhaps more doubtfuL SuppoSe that there are 
just two commodities, bread and wine. A distribution, deemed 
equitable by all, is arranged, with the wine-lovers getting 
more wine and less bread than the abstainers. Suppose now 
that all the wine is destroyed. Are the wine-lovers entitled, 
because of that fact, to more than an equal share of bread? 
The answer is, of course, a value judgement. My own feeling 
is that tastes for unattainable alternatives should have nothing 
to do with the decision among the attainable ones; desires in 
conflict with reality are not entitled to consideration, so that 
Condition 3, reinterpreted in terms of tastes rather than values, 
is a valid value judgement, to me at least. 
[!, p. 73] 
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Arrow's argument, quoted above, does establiSh the fact that 
social choice derived from a rank order voting process is not total, 
reflexive, transitive rational. If it were then the choice function would 
satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference, since we are talking 
about finite sets [2]. (5], [ 11] , and his example shows this axiom is 
clearly violated. As it tul:-ns out, other examples can be used to show 
that social choice by the rank order voting process is not rational at all 
to any degree. 
This example has caused considerable confusion in the literature 
about the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom. Almost all 
criticisms which have been directed at this axiom are actually criticisms 
f h . 1. . 11 o t e ratlona tty axtoms. As a result the problems v.i th rational choice 
have remained unrecognized while the possible interpretations of Independence 
of Irrelevant Alternatives have not been explored. 
Actually the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axioin can be 
Close examination shows, again, that this example, as stated, is 
unrelated to his independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. The 
problem is that in this example, as in the rank ordering example he is 
changing the feasible set. Had he simply required that to him the allocation 
of a fixed amount of bread should be independent of-people's taste for 
unavailable wine, the example would be well taken. 
11 For example, the following 11 restatement'' of the axiom is 
hopelessly entwined with the rationality postulates. 
2. If the removal from or insertion into the set of possibilities 
of a certain possibility x results in no change in any individual 
order of the remaining possibilities, then it must cause no 
change in the collective order of those possibilities. This 
condition is named the 'independence of irrelevant alternatives.' 
[6. p. 422] 
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viewed as a defining characteristic of those choice functions which can be 
implemented as processes. The axiom simply says that equilibriums depend 
only upon preferences over the 11feasible" set. This is a property of almost 
all behavioral models -- including the competitive model. A rather extensive 
discussion of this point can be found at [10]. 
Rational Social Choice: Interpretations 
The idea of rational social choice is, from a technical point of 
view, rather pervasive in economic writings. Many tools, if used to forge 
an economic process or system, would necessarily cause rational choice 
to be a property of that system. The most important of these tools are 
social preference relations, social welfare functions and social benefit 
functions. 
Many view the job of a ''social engineer11 to be one of de singing 
systems in a manner which assures that the process outcomes are always 
the "best" according to some "social preference relation," Without 
inquiring about the source of this "preference relation, 11 which is usually 
at least a sub-order, 12 we can see immediately a consequence of the 
procedure. If the equilibriums of a process are viewed as a ''choice" 
and if the process is designed so that the 11 outcomes" or "equilibriums" 
are maximal according to some social preference relation then that process 
chooses rationally when individuals' preferences are fixed and the consumption 
12A binary relation is a sub-order in case it is total, reflexive and 
obeys the law [ -zRy A....,yRx => xRz]. The binary relations xly, ylz, xP2.; 
an::'!· :I!:P':-~ yPz, xlz are both sub-orders. Such binary relations have the 
property that every finite set has a "maximal" element. T~at is, from 
any v there is at least one x f v such that xRy for all y m v . [4] 
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possibility set varies. The rationalization is simply the initial •·social 
preference relation. " 
We can see immediately that the same argument applies equally 
to the use of a social welfare function. Such a function is usually of the 
form W(x) or W(u1(x), u 2 (x), •.. , un(x)) where the u(·)'s are numerical 
representations of individual preference relations. It is to be used as 
follows. The system is to be designed (perhaps including a public servant 
who always implements the "proper" outcome) so that the outcomes from 
any consumption possibilities set v , are those which maximize W(·) over v . 
We see immediately that processes designed according to the 
maximization of social welfare are processes which "choose" rationally. 
In order to see this we simply define a binary relation R, for all x and y 
1 n 1 n in E as xRy if and only if W(u (x), ... , u (x)) ~ W(u (y), •.• , u (y)). 
We see then, for fixed individual preferences the outcomes from any v 
are the maximal elements of R in v • Hence the process is rational 
since R is the rationalization. One can then view W(•) as simply a 
numerical representation of R • 
A procedure of altering processes in accord with certain types of 
cost-benefit methods will also induce rationality into social choice. Let 
B{y, x) be the "net benefits" of state x over state y. If B(y, x} > 0 we say 
the "net benefits" of moving from y to x are positive and if B(y, x} < 0 
we say they are negative. The design of systems should proceed by 
assuring that the outcome, from any agenda v are the allocations in v 
from which it is not 11beneficial 11 to move. That is, the outcomes, over 
v , would be y 
0 
t v such that B(y 
0
, x} _::.. 0 for all x e v . Now if 
B(y, z) :.:: B(y, x) + B{x, z} there is a function W(·) such that 
B(y, x) ::: W(x) - W(y). 13 We need only note that the chosen alternatives 
from any set would be those which maximize W(•) -- this function is, 
in essence, a social welfare function. We can then, from W(•) deduce the 
implied preference relation following the procedure above. The process 
will choose rationally. 14 
We see then that if social choice reflects the use of a social 
preference relation, a social welfare function or a "benefits" function, 
then choice will be rational. A natural question is, why on earth would 
we want to use tools which place such a restriction on a model? Surely, 
11 social preferences," 11benefits'' or "welfare'' are not ''experiencedn 
in any meaningful sense. Few claim to ''see" or "measure" social 
welfare, In fact very few claim that these objects are even amenable to 
such realizations. The two major arguments, one due to Samuelson and 
the other due to Arrow, are discussed below. 
SECTION TWO 
Throughout the development of economics, as well as the social 
15 
sciences in general, there has been a tendency for scholars to describe events 
and activities by using terms which are, essentially, subjective. Political-
economic events are often described in terms which are fully understood 
13Where finite sets are involved, things get somewhat more complicated. 
See [13] for a discussion of addative representations of relations. 
14 
There are ways of stating the "cost- benefit" principle which 
do not imply rational choice. For example B(y, x) may be defined in a 
_tnanner which depends upon v • The "costs" 'of producing x over y may 
aep~nd."upoil whether or not it was possible to produce z • In this case 
the choice would not necessarily be rational. 
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only to the user. Equality, fairness, efficient, democratic, just, public 
interest, and social values are just a few. Occasionally such terms can 
be defined abstractly but their use in common parlance and in 11 sdentific 11 
writing is seldom accompanied by definition. The scientific development 
of a subject can be equated to the ability of ''scientists'' to communicate, 
in writing, in a manner which allows independent verification of events 
(cookbook procedures). This cannot be done when the terms are subjective. 
This problem of subjective terms appears to be recognized at 
several points in the development of economics. It is probably the reason 
that ''interpersonal comparisons of utility 11 is considered to be an 11unscien-
tific" procedure. The idea of another person's utility is not, even in 
principle, a sufficiently isolated 'bbject of experience"to be used free of 
"researcher bias." On the other hand the idea of ''preference" with its 
foundations in choice behavior is not complicated by such problems --at 
the conceptual level at least. 
This problem of subjective terms might also be the reason why 
appraisals or explications of events in terms of appraisals tend to be 
purged from the body of scientific procedures. 15 Such procedures allow 
discoveries to be known only to the discoverer, since, by definition. 
transmission of results cannot be achieved even at the conceptual level, 
in a manner which allows independent verification. 
It is along these lines that the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare 
15Notice that the word appraisal (perhaps approval would serve as 
well) is used rather than the term rivalue judgment" or the term "norm. 11 
The reason is that I find the latter terms somewhat hopelessly entangled 
with the concept of "preference." I would like to be free to discuss "value 
judgments" without appraising them. More importantly, however, I wish 
to make a clear distinction between "ethics" and ''preferences" below. 
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function serves as an important bridge from the art of economics to the 
science. The tool allowed the economic practitioner to serve, for the first 
time, an engineering function. For the first tim.e "ends 11 could be separated 
from ''means. 11 "Ends" could be stated in a manner which allowed systems 
to be designed in accord with those ends, by individuals other than the 
one(s) stating the "ends. 11 If given the ends {the ends maximize a particular 
function), anyone could, independently, check to see if they were attained 
by a given process. 
Now, the contribution outlined above should not be confused with 
problems pertaining to the~ of the social welfare function. The 
economist is told to have this function maximized -- not "social welfare" 
without the latter being specified. The source of the function is an 
important but different issue. Unfortunately debate frequently finds the 
two problems confused so a recognition of the substantial contribution of 
the Bergson-Samuelson construction is lost. 
The advantage of the tool (if not the reason for the advantage) is 
clearly stated by Samuelson. 
It is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to examine the 
consequences of various value judgments, whether or not they are 
shared by the theorist, just as the study of comparative ethics 
is itself a science like any other branch of anthropology. If it 
is appropriate for the economist to analyze the way Robinson 
Crusoe directs production so as to maximize his {curious) 
preferences, the economist does not thereby commit himself 
to those tastes or inquire concerning the manner in which they 
were or ought to have been formed. No more does the astronomer, 
who enunciates the principle that the paths of planets are such 
as to minimize certain integrals, care whether or not these 
should be minimized; neither for all we know do the stars care, 
(14, p. 220] 
He continues, however, along lines I believe to be misleading. 
This juncture is most important since it is along the intuitive lines, directed 
by the foHowing quotes, that welfare economics has proceeded. 
Without inquiring into its origins, we take as a starting point 
for our discussion a function of all the economic magnitudes of a 
system which is supposed to characterize some ethical belief --
that of a benevolent despot, or a complete egotist, or "all men of 
good will, " a misanthrope, the state, race, or group mind, God, 
etc. Any possible opinion is admissible, including my own, although 
it is best in the first instance, in view of human frailty where one's 
own beliefs are involved, to omit the latter. We only require that 
the belief be such as to admit of an unequivocal answer as to 
whether one configuration of the economic system is 11better' 1 or 
"worse" than any other or 11 indi££erent," and that these relation-
ships are transitive; i.e., A better than B, B better than C 
implies A better than C , etc. The function need only be 
ordinally defined, and it may or may not be convenient to work 
with (any) one cardinal index or indicator. There is no need to 
assume any particular curvature of the loci (in hyper- space) of 
indifference of this function. 
(14, p. 22l] 
The new welfare economics is characterized as 
.•• a systematic way of introducing from outside of economics 
various ethical norms {as embodied technically in what is called 
a social welfare function) -- and so ordering the exposition of 
the conditions for an optimum that we first state these which 
require only the weakest postulates, and which therefore hold 
for the widest possible set of cases, and only later introduce 
the narrower and more restrictive hypotheses. 
(15, p. 37] 
The argument is repeated. 
Without norms, normative statements are impossible. At 
some point welfare economics must introduce ethical welfare 
functions from outside of economics. Which set of ends is relevant 
is decidedly not a scientific question of economics. This should 
dispel the notion that by a social welfare function is meant some 
one, unique, and privileged set of ends. Any prescribed set of 
ends is grist for the economist's unpretentious deductive mill, 
and often he can be expected to reveal that the prescribed ends 
are incomplete and inconsistent. The social welfare function is 
a concept as broad and empty as language itself-- and as necessary. 
Whether we call it W, or G , or describe it in words is, of 
course, immaterial. 
[15, pp. 37-38] 
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The key word in the above quote is the word "must" used in the second 
sentence. The implication of this statement and the other two quotes 
above is that the use of ethical postulates ~sitates the use of a function. 
This implication is repeated in his discussion of the closely related 
rationality postulates in the Arrow model. "Give up Axiom 1 -- a well-
behaved ordering with transitivity-- and the whole problem vanishes 
into thin air.'' [16, p. 49] 
His arguments involve two separate propositions. 1) The design 
of economic systems along ethical lines presupposes an objectively stated 
set of ethics. 2) Ethical propositions in economic models can only be 
reflected in total, reflexive, transitive binary relations. I have no quarrel 
with the first, but I do disagree with the second. His assumption, as will 
be established below, places an arbitrary restriction on the class of 
ethical propositions with which economists can work. 
Ethical Propositions 
Ethical propositions are reflections of the primitive 11 should. 11 
You should not steal. You should not kill. You should treat others as 
you would like to be treated, etc. This idea of what you "should11 do, 
may, or may not be consistent with some "idea of ''good, 11 "better,'' or 
"best. 11 
I h h . 16 · If· . I db h . n s art, an et 1c 1tse 1.s 1n genera. repres·ente y a c o1ce 
function as opposed to a binary relation. Frorr1 any set of alternatives it 
16
rn [10] I make a distinction between 11absolute" ethics and "relative" 
ethics. A relative ethic is a family of absolute ethics -- it is an ethic 
which requires actions to accord with at least one of a set of one or more 
absolute ethics. Several ethical propositions in economics are of this form. 
(the ethic) indicates which alternatives should, or should not, be among 
the chosen elements. For example when faced with a set of alternatives, 
all alternatives involving the action 11 kill 11 should be in the set not _chosen. 
Consider a version of the Pareto principle -- when faced with a set of 
opportunities, the social outcomes should not contain Pareto dominated 
alternatives. A little different version could state -- from any set of 
alternatives--all Pareto undominated alternatives should be among the 
outcomes. 
Abstractly, let v be a set of alternatives, an agenda, let 
S(v, ~· ..• , Rn) C v be the set which "should" be chosen from v 
according to some given ethic when the elements of v are available and 
preferences are given as ~· ••• , Rn. Let S(v, ~· ••• , Rn) be the 
set which "should not'' be chosen from v, according to sorre other ethic. 
zo 
We say that the functions S( ••• ) and S( .•• ) are, respectively, positive 
and negative ethics (or ''representations" of ethics). Notice that individual 
preferences are included as parameters since "ethics" are frequently 
involved with attitudes. 0£ course we could have included properties of 
"social states," other than how people feel about them, as parameters. 
Notice also that an ethic is of the same mathematical form as social choice 
functions. We assert that any ethic can be represented by a choice function 
and any choice function can be viewed as a representation of some ethic. 17 
17 We can say the 
Sn(v, R,.• 
imply the ethics 
systems o£ ethics S1(v, ~· •.. , Rn)• 
, R ) and S(v, R~, , R ), 
n --,. n 
S(v, R,.• n i - U S (v, R,_. 
i=l 
, Rn} and 
n . 
- u s'(v, R,_ • 
i = 1 
• • . , Rn}• respectively. 
So, a system of ethics is itself an ethic. 
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What is the relationship between ethics and the word "better" 
used by Samuelson? While ethics, or applications of the word 11 should, 11 
have in general a choice function representation, the idea of "better" is, 
inherently, only a binary relation. Formally we would say, where xGy 
means ' 1x is at least as good as y," that x is "better" than y in case 
xGy and not yGx ; and, that x is 11best," relative to some set v , in 
case x is G-maximal in v We can say an ethic is consistent with 
some idea of 11 better 11 in case there exists a binary relation (an 11at least 
as good as" relation) such that the chosen elements (parameters other 
than the feasible set v , being fixed) are 11best" according to this relation. 
That is, an ethic is consistent with the word 11better 11 or the phrase "at 
least as good as" in case the choice function representation of the ethic is 
rational. Furthermore, we would say that the idea of "at least as good as" 
employed is transitive in case the representation of the ethic is transitive 
rational. 18 
We can now make a very important observation. Not all ethics 
have rational representations. This means that, if we are to interpret 
a rationalization of a choice function (representing some idea of 11 should") 
as an 11at least as good as" relation (that is, xGy means, when G is the 
rationalization, that x is at least as good as y ) then not all ethics are 
consistent with the idea nbetter" or "worse" or "best11 -- at least to the 
extent that 11 better 11 is a binary relation and 11 best' 1 are the maximal 
elements. We need only observe that the set of 11 rational 11 choice functions 
{over some speci£ied range) is but a small subset of the set of all choice 
18
we also suggest that a consistent use of the word "value, 11 at least 
within political economic models, is as a numeX'ical representation of an 
11at least as good as 11 relation. 
functions. 
The first assertion of this paper is now established. Use of the 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare fun:: tion places arbitrary restrictions 
on the set of admissible ethics. Why should analysis be restricted to 
ethics whose representations are rational (total, reflexive, transitive 
rational at that}? No answer has been supplied. In fact, many of the 
ethics actually stated in the economics literature are not rational [10] 
The second major argument of this paper is that the family of 
ethics compatible with a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is, 
from one important point of view, very "uninteresting.'' This argument 
will be taken up in the final section with Arrow's General Possibilities 
Theorem. 
We turn our attention now to the major advantages prmrided by 
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the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. The advantages a.re derived 
from the fact that the function could be viewed as a representation of a 
system of ethics, in "objectiven terms. The advantages remain if the 
function is a choice function as opposed to a real valued function or binary 
re_lation. 19 The welfare function has. then, no special advantages. 
The design of systems can proceed as before -- only without the 
social welfare function. Let S{v, ~· • , Rn) be a positive ethic and 
S(v, ~· ... , Rn) a negative ethic. We say the process represented by the 
social choice function C(v, ~· • . , Rn)• is compatible with S(v, ~' ..•• Rn) 
in case, for all admissible (v, ~· •• , R,_), S(v, ~· .•• , Rn) C C(v, ~· ••• Rn). 
19wh'l h . . . . I 1 e t ere ts, tn prtnctp e no problem of transmitting the concept 
there may be practical problems in cases of large numbers of alternatives. 
See the discussion in [10] on "goals. n 
We say C(v, R_, •.. , R ) is compatible with S( v, R., ... , R ) in case for 
-r n -r n ' 
all admi,,ib1e (v, ~· •.. , Rn)' C(v, ~· ••. , Rn) n S(v, ~· .•. , Rn) = 0 , 
where 0 is the empty set. We say 11 social choice'' is compatible with 
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an ethic in case those elements 'which "should" be chosen are' always chosen 
and those elemert s which ''should not" be chosen are never chosen. Whether 
or not the chosen elements can be viewed as "bestn is another, independent 
and perhaps irrelevant matter. 
The Arrow Argument 
At least three different, but distinct lines of argument can be 
found in Arrow 1 s work, in favor of whit has been called his "consistency 
conditions." These conditions simply assert that social choice must be 
rationalized by a total, reflexive, transitive binary relation. The rationali-
zation is called the 11 social preference]( relation. Precisely why one would 
make such an assumption weighs heavily on the interpretation of Arrow's 
major result. 
The first type of justification given is essentially the same as 
that given by Samuelson. T~at is, the ''social preference relation'' 
is simply a reflexion of~ system of ethics. The second justification is 
that the existential quantification or definition of something called a "social 
preference" is attempted. 
These first two justifications are often confusingly intertwined 
in his arguments. Part of the problem is a failure to distinguish between 
value judgments, ethical propositions, preferences, tastes and values. 
The following quote seems to contain a bit of everything. 
: .. ·_Given th~se basic value judgments as to the mode of aggregating 
1nd1v1dual des1re s, the economist should investigate those mechanisms 
for social choice which satisfy the value judgmerl: s and should check 
their consequences to see if still other value judgments might be 
violated. In particular he should ask the question whether or not 
the value judgments are consistent with each other, i.e., do there 
exist any mechanisms of social choice which will in fact satisfy 
the value judgments made? For example, in the voting paradox 
discussed above, if the method of majority choice is regarded as 
itself a value judgment, then we are forced to the conclusion that 
the value judgment in question, applied to the particular situation 
indicated, is self- contradictory. 
[1, pp. 4-5] 
The first two sentences indicate that he clearly intends social 
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choices to ultimately conform to some given set of ethics ( 11 value judgments" 
to him). That is, one function of an applied welfare economist is to provide 
the design of an economic system along some externally stated ethical lines. 
The third sentence then declares that an ethical proposition which fails 
to dictate rati?nal choice is "self-contradictory." From this we would 
conclude that the representation of an ethical proposition must be a 
transitive binary relation. This is the same formulation used by Samuelson 
and examined above. 
The next quote is also of interest. Here, as a purpose of the 
research, he appears to seek a 11 reasonable" definition of a social preference 
relation. By virtue of being a ' 1preference 11 it must have the properties 
(namely his consistency conditions) or preferences. 
In ideal dictatorship there is but one will involved in choice, in 
an ideal society ruled by convention there is the divine will or 
perhaps, by assumption, a common will of all individuals concerning 
social decisions, so in either case no conflict of individual wills is 
involved. The methods of voting and the market, on the other hand, 
are methods of amalgamating the tastes of many individuals in the 
making of social choices. The methods of dictatorship are, or can 
be rational in the sense that any individual can be rational in his 
choices. Can such consistency be attributed to collective modes of 
choice, where the wills of many people are involved? 
[1, p. 21 
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This interpretation of the rationality postulate, along with the 
one above, I consider to be, for practical purposes, the same as the 
Bergson-Samuelson interpretation. The third justification Arrow gives is 
considerably different. 
It is against this background that the importance of the transitivity 
condition becomes clear. Those familiar with the integrability 
controversy in the field of consumer's demand theory will observe 
that the basic problem is the same: the independence of the final 
choice from the path to it. Transitivity ~ill insure this independence; 
from any environment, there will be a chosen alternative, and, in 
the absence of a deadlock, no place for the historically given alter-
native to be chosen by default. 
That an intransitive social choice mechanism may as a matter 
of observed fact produce decisions that are clearly unsatisfactory 
has been brought out in different ways by Riker and by Dahl. 
Riker 1s emphasis is on the possibility that legislative .rules may 
lead to choice of a proposal opposed by a majority, Dahl's rather 
on the possibility that the rules lead to a deadlock and therefore 
a socially undesired inaction. The notion of a "democratic 
paralysis, 11 a failure to act due not to a desire for inaction but an 
inability to agree on the proper action, seems to me to deserve 
much further empirical, as well as theoretical, study. 
Collective rationality in the social choice mechanism is not 
then merely an illegitimate transfer from the individual to society, 
but an important attribute of a genuinely democratic system capable 
of full adaptation to varying environments. 
[1. p. 120. emphasis added] 
The striking thing about this rather eloquent argument is that it :is 
followed by neither elaboration nor clarification even tho_ugh this type of 
justification is alluded to at several points in Arrow's writings. Several 
formalizations are possible. Only one \o\d.ll be followed here. 
First, consider the idea of a rule for tabulating social choices 
over "small" sets. For example, majority rule is a rule for tabulating 
choices over two element seta. Now given such a rule. defined over a 
family of "small" sets, 20 social choice over "large sets" is accomplished 
2°The family, of course, could be viewed as a bases. In addition 
"status quo" c;:oncept may extend the "bases." See [10] for a method of 
introducing the concept into the analysis. 
by "repeated application" of the rule. 
Consider majority rule for example. Let M( { x, y}, ~· ... , Rn) 
indicate the 0 majority winner'' between x and y when preferences 
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(~, ... , Rn) are given. Suppose further that people vote in accord with 
their preference, that is, preferences are also decision rules, 21 the number 
of people is an ''odd number" and indifference is not a property of preferences. 
Under these conditions there is always but a single element in the set 
M({ x,y i. ~· ... , Rn). 
Suppose now, "society" is faced with a choice from a three element 
set. We wish to construct a function (or process), C( { x, y, z i, !)_• ••. , Rn), 
which indicates the "outcome" or ''social cho:ice 11 from the three element 
set. Since the "rule'' can act only on two element sets it cannot be applied 
directly. We can, however, use the rule to define or derive an outcome 
for the three element set. That is we can use certain proced.ures to 
~choice from two element sets to choice over larger sets. 
This extension could be achieved in several different ways, by 
repeated application of the "rule." For example, we could define 
C({ x, y, z}, ~· ... , Rn) as follows: 
C( {x,y, z}, ~· ••• , Rn) _ M( {z, M({ x,y}, ~· ... , Rn) i,~, ... , Rn). 
In words, choice over the set { x, y, z} is defined by first taking th.e winner 
of a majority ballot between x and y and placing it against z . What 
about the four element set { w, x, y, z} ? One way (there are others) would 
be to place the winner from the set {w, x} against the winner of the set 
ZlThis assumption is not in general.necessary. It could be achieved 
axiomatically by an application o£ Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives axiom taken together with Pareto Optimality but, for purposes 
here, there is no reason to take that route. 
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{ y, z}. The winner of winners would then be the 11 choice. 11 That is, 
we 'M:'>Uld have 
C( {w, x, y, z}, ~· •.. , Rn):: M({M({ w, x}, ~· .•. , Rn), M({y, z }, ~· •.. , Rn) }, !)• ... , Rn). 
Notice that choice over the four element set is derived from choice over two 
element sets. 
Those familiar with the voter 1s paradox may already have detected 
a problem. The outcome, or social choice, frmn { x, y, z } and from 
{ w, x, y, z}, in the case of the voter's paradox depends critically upon 
the 11 sequence' 1 or, more broadly, ''path, 11 of choice over the two element 
sets. Had the winner from the set { x, z} been put against y, the social 
choice from {x, y, z} would have been different. Or, in the case of the 
four element set { w, x, y, z } the choice would ha.ve been different had 
winners from { w, y} and { x, z } been pitted together. 22 
I take it that this dependence upon the "path" of choice is what 
Arrow finds objectionable. Of course, since the motivation is not precisely 
stated it is impossible to specify his argument exactly. At a broad level 
22
rn the case of majority rule we might want to define the social 
choice as the set of elements which could win through some sequence or 
path. That is, we may construct a process for which voters voted according 
to their preferences using some format of majority rule contests. However, 
any format may arise. There may be no n1aws 11 governing this, so the 
''outcomes'' or "equilibriums''-- before the fact-- would be the set of 
elements which could win by some format. In the three element case, 
for particular configurations of preferences, the choice would be all three 
elements. 
The surprising thing about this process is that it violates Pareto 
Optimality. Consider the four element set { w, x, y, z} and let the preferences 
offiveindividualsbe: w,y,x,z forthefirsttwo; y,x,z,w for number 
three; x, z, w, y for number 4; and x, y, z, w for nurrilier five. Now suppose 
the path of voting is that the winner of { x, y} is put against w • The winner 
of the second vote is then put against z . The outcome, along this path, 
is z . But a check of the preference relations reveals that x is unanimously 
preferred over z . Thus, z is chosen even though Pareto-dominated. 
The process does not satisfy the Pareto principle. 
he demands that social choice be free from the arbitrary parameter 
11path. 1123 He argues that the rationality postulates or 11 consistency 
conditions" are necessitated by this demand, 
No such necessity is implied at all. Consider the example 
C(a)= a fora<:. [{x}, {y}, {z}, {x,y},{x,z},{y,z}] and 
C'({ x, y, z}} = { x, z}, Without specifying the "rule'' in mechanized terms 
or the 11 sets" over which it operates, we can see that this choice {unction 
satisfies Independence of Path. This claim can be seen at an intuitive 
level from the following observations. 
C({C({x}) U C({y,z})}) C({{x)U{y,zll) C({x~y~z}) {x,z} 
C({C({y)) U C({x,z})}) C({{y) U{x,z) }) C({x~y,z}) {x,z} 
C({C({z)) U C({x,y))}) C({{z)U{x,yll) C({x,y,z}) {x,z} 
C({C({x,y)) U C({x,z))}) = C({{x,y}U {x,z}}) = C({x,y,z}) = {x,z} 
etc., etc. 
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we can pursue my interpretation of this formally-- from [9] --
Assume E is a finite set. 
Let V = { v 1, ... , v m} be a family of subsets of E . For all SCE 
define v5 ={V: Uv = S}. Assume that veE & v J ~ => C(v) f ~ 
v<V 
(I.P.) Independence of Path: 
(VS) {V<VS & V'•Vs "? C(UC(v}) C(UC(v'))j 
SCE v<V 
The axiom says we can choose over S directly, or arbitrarily 
segment S, choose over the parts, then choose over the choices 
without changing the ultimate result. Notice that the property holds 
for all S so one can further refine the segments without worry. 
24 r h · · · · [9 I A formal proof o t e assert10n 1s g1ven 1n . 
28 
We can now make a very important observation. Although the 
example is a choice function which is Independent of the Path it is not a 
t . l h . f · 25 Th · · ra 1ona c 01ce unctlon. at 1s, an assumphon of rational choice is 
not necessitated by a demand that choice be independent of the path. 
We have now established the fourth assertion of this paper. The 
argument provided by Arrow in support of the rational choice assumption 
is simply wrong. The importance of this observation should not be 
minimized. If Independence of the Path is demanded in place of rational 
choice, Arrow's major result, The General Possibilities Theorem, does 
not hold. There are decision processes which satisfy Independence of the 
Path and all of Arrow's conditions (other than rationality). 26 
Several interesting questions as well as interesting results have 
been omitted from this section. When the set of alternatives is expanded 
to an infinite set several complications arise. Also there are connections 
between Independent of Path behavior and 11preferences, 11 see [9 J. But 
the major observation is established. If Independent of Path behavior is 
29 
all that is desired then the rational choice assumptions-~ even the weakest 
forms -- can be dropped. 
25
we can show this as follows. Recall a choice function is rational 
if there exists a rationalization-- a binary relation for which the chOsen 
elements ar~ always m~ximal accordirg to this binary relation. Suppose 
such a relation, R, ex1sts. From the two element choices we conclude 
yRa for a e {x, z} ani thus y is maximal in {x, y, z} . But, since 
Y t C({ x, y, z} ), we contradict the assertion that R is a rationalization. 
26Not all f o Arrow 1 s conditions are stated in terms of choice functions 
so his conditions must be reworded accordingly for this assertion to be 
technically true. When the alterations are made a process which chooses 
the Pareto Optimals serves as a counter example to a proposed impossibility 
result. 
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SECTION THREE 
The first sentence of this paper asserted, in spirit at least, that 
concepts such as "social preference," "social rationality, 11 "public 
interest, 11 "social benefits" and "social welfare" should be dropped from 
the bag of tools. They are, as has been argued here, the same concept 
when looked at as a formal property of models. 
The concepts do not span the range of interpretations which have 
been attributed to them. In the case of Arrow, we have shown that the set 
of rational social choice functions is but a subset of those which a:re 
characterized by the "independence of path11 property. We have also 
argued that use of a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function places 
an arbitrary restriction on the set of ethics which can be reflected in 
social choices. 
We shall now argue that the class of rational social choice 
functions, while from either the Arrow or Samuelson point of view, is an 
11uninteresting 11 class. I say 11 uninteresting11 because the intersection of 
this class of social choice functions with the class of social choice functions 
which could, conceivably, be implemented as efficient social decision 
processes, yields a set of choice functions which are representations of 
dictatorship processes. To repeat, any social choice function which 
1) is transitive rational, 2) satisfies Pareto optimality, and 3) is capable 
of being implemented as a process is a dictatorial choice function. 27 
In order to establish this assertion we need only recall the 
discussion, above, concerning the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
27 Assume there are at least three people, at least three alternatives 
and that the domain of the choice function is "large. 11 
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axiom and then appeal directly to Arrow 1s General Possibility Theorem. 
It was indicated above and is argued at somewhat greater length in [10] 
that the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom can serve as the 
· · ZB Th t . h . defining characteristic of a group dec1s1on process. a 15, any c o1ce 
function satisfying the defining characteristic could, in principle, be the 
equilibriums of ~process stated as a function the parameters. 
Furthermore, any choice function which does not satisfy the axiom is 
incapable of being an accurate representation of any process. 
Arrow 1 s result can be stated as follows. If you are given a set 
of ethics which a) are transitive rational and b) include pareto optimality 
then all processes29 for which the equilibriums are always what they 
11 should" be, according to the given system of ethics, are dictatorship 
processes. 
The title of this paper includes the word "relevance." How can 
social choice theory be relevant in view of such a negative result? Easy! 
Simply drop the rationality assumptions. Very little would be lost and 
much would be gained. 
The major advantage of the social preference concept is that it 
allows, at least in principle, applied economists to perform an engineering 
function. It allows the 11 objective 11 to be 11 objectively" stated. It allows 
communication among researchers as to the success of their efforts in 
28The axiom states that choice over any arbitrary set S depends only 
upon individuals 1 preference over S and nothing outside of S . The 
assertion is that this is a characteristic of all socio-economic processes. 
A change in preferences for things infeasible does not change equilibrium 
over the feasible set. 
Z9We assume the domain is sufficiently large. 
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relation to an attempted objective. This should not be confused with the 
problem of choosing an objective. 
This advantage need not be lost. Ethics can still be captured in 
a formal way (in principle at least), by choice functions as opposed to 
binary relations or numerical functions. Such choice functions, naturally, 
may be difficult to express in words-- but so are binary relations and 
numerical functions. At the conceptual level, at least, such difficulties 
do not exist. More importantly, however, the more versatile method of 
representation, suggested here, allows research to move systematically 
into areas which have been previously unexplored in a formal way. 
Furthermore, since discussions of processes frequently take place in 
ethical terminology the possibility exists that models built with ethics as 
the objects of debate (variables) as opposed to allocations, will have better 
explanatory power. 
Removal of the rationality conditions allows the possibility of 
discovering ways to build choice from the application of rules. If we 
replace the social rationality with Independence of the Path, Arrow's 
impossibility result is left behind. Many social choice functions satisfy 
his conditions with rationality replaced by the independence property. More 
importantly the power of axiomatic method can be used to discover the rules. 
Once one specifies how the system 11 should" behave the axiomatic method 
can be applied to find the proper equilibriums. The problem then becomes 
one of properly designing institutions. 
[I J 
[2 J 
[3 J 
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Glossary 
is the empty set 
e means is an element of 
means implies 
[ ••• ] means - ..• is a true statement 
AC B means [ x E A => x £ B J 
means - not 
v means or 
A means - and (it does not mean and/or) 
v means - for all 
means there exists 
{8: ••• } is read- the set of 8 for which the statement ••. is true 
AU B {x: xe:Av xt=:B} 
{x: XEAA xEB} 
Uv means- the union of all sets v which are elements of V. 
veV 
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(V 0) [ ••• ] 
" 
is read - for all 8 such that the statement $ is true the 
statement [ ••• ] is also true. 
f(x) - g(x) means - (V x) [f(x) = g(x)] 
A@B {(x,y): X EAA y EB} 
R is a binary relation on A means RC A@A 
xRy means - (x,y) e: R 
xPy means -[xRy A -yRx] for some specific R 
xly means -[xRy AyRx] for some specific R 
A binary relation R over a set A is 
total in case ( V x) 
xeA 
( Vy) 
YeA 
yf.x 
[ xRy V yRx] 
reflexive in case (Vx) [xRx] 
xeA 
transitive in case ( V x) 
XEA 
( v y) 
yeA 
y #x 
( V z) 
zcA 
z #x 
ziy 
[ xRy 1\ yRz :=> xRz J 
An element x is said to be R-maximal over a set A in case 
xeA A [(Vy) xRy]. 
y ' A 
36 
A choice function C(v) with domain U is said to be rational in case there 
exists a binary relation R such that 
( Vv) [ x E C(v) => x is R-maxima:l over vJ 
v 'U 
The binary relation R is said to rationalize C(v) or be a rationalization. 
A rational choice function C(v) is said to be 
reflexive rational in case there exists a reflexive rationalization 
total rational in case there exists a total rationalization 
transitive rational in case there exists a transitive rationalization 
total, reflexive, transitive rational in case there exists a total, 
reflexive, transitive rationalization. 
